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Summary Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was a new human disease in the
autumn of 2002. It first occurred in Southern China in November 2002 and was
transported to Hong Kong on February 21, 2003 by an infected and ill patient. Ten
secondary cases spread the infection to two hospitals in Hong Kong and to Singapore,
Toronto and Hanoi. In March 2003 a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was found to be the
causative agent. Within 11 weeks from the first SARS case in Hong Kong it had spread to
an additional 27 countries or special administrative regions. The mini pandemic peaked
during the last week of May 2003 and the last new probable case was on July 13, 2003.
There were a total of 8096 probable cases and 774 deaths. Sixty-six per cent of the cases
occurred in China, 22% in Hong Kong, 4% in Taiwan and 3% in both Singapore and
Canada. Twenty-one per cent of all cases occurred in healthcare workers.
 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.INTRODUCTION and 774 deaths.1–3 The aetiologic agent of SARS (a pre-It is an honour to have been asked to contribute the lead
paper in this symposium on paediatric SARS. Of all the
participants in this symposium I have the distinction of
having had no first-hand experience with SARS. Never-
theless, I do have some credentials. In March of 2003 I
travelled to and through Hong Kong, Shanghai, Taipei,
Seoul and Narita and realised on my trip back to Los
Angeles on March 17th that I needed a chapter on SARS for
the 5th edition of our book ‘Textbook of Pediatric Infectious
Diseases’ which was soon to be published. So, with the help
of four Hong Kong colleagues this chapter was written in
under 2 weeks and is the most complete reference to date
relating to paediatrics.1
SARS was apparently a new human disease which first
occurred in Southern China in the autumn of 2002 and
spread to 29 countries or regions with a total of 8096 cases*Correspondence to: J. D. Cherry. Department of Pediatrics,
David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, 10833 Le Conte
Ave., MDCC 22-442, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1752, USA.
Tel.: +1 310 825 5226; Fax: +1 310 206 4764;
E-mail: jcherry@mednet.ucla.edu.
1526-0542/$ – see front matterviously unrecognised coronavirus; SARS-CoV) was isolated
and its genome sequenced in record time.3–8 Following an
incredible global public health effort, the mini pandemic was
brought under control within 7 months of its initial occur-
rence.9 The overall effort demonstrated unprecedented
international cooperation and this was facilitated by elec-
tronic transmission of information. In general, worldwide
media coverage was unusually accurate and provided
pictures to augment scientific data.
As of June 1st, 2004 there were approximately 2000
citations related to SARS in the medical literature. How-
ever, of these publications only about 0.1% are related to
children.CASE DEFINITIONS
During the third week of March 2003 both the WHO and
the CDC published preliminary case definitions for severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Table 1 contains the
WHO initial definitions of suspect and probably cases and
Table 2 the CDC original definition of a suspected case.10,11
Following the rapidly expanding knowledge about SARS 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Table 1 WHO SARS case definitions as of 16 March 2003*.
Suspect case
A person presenting after 1 February, 2003 with history of high fever (> 38 8C)
and one or more respiratory symptoms, including cough, shortness of breath, difficulty breathing and one or more of the following:
 Close contact,y within 10 days of onset of symptoms, with a person who has been diagnosed with SARS
 History of travel, within 10 days of onset of symptoms, to an area in which there are reported foci of transmission of SARS
Probable case
A suspect case with chest X-ray findings of pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome. or a suspect case with an
unexplained respiratory illness resulting in death, with an autopsy examination demonstrating the pathology of respiratory
distress syndrome without an identifiable cause
* From: the World Health Organization, Weekly Epidemiological Record No. 12, 21 March, 2003.
y Defined as having cared for, having lived with, or having had direct contact with respiratory secretions and/or body fluids of a
person suspected of having SARS.the WHO case definitions were revised on May 1, 2003
(Table 3).12 The CDC case definition was updated on four
occasions throughout the epidemic as understanding of the
clinical, laboratory, and transmission characteristics of SARS
associated coronavirus increased.13 The most recent ver-
sion from the CDC, which is exceedingly complex, is
presented in Table 4.THE EPIDEMIC ONSET
Transmission of SARS apparently first occurred in Fosham
City, Guangdong Province, China.1,9 The primary case may
have been a 46-year-old man who had a fever for 9 days
and respiratory distress. He was hospitalised and treated in
an intensive care unit. He recovered but his wife, aunt, and
aunt’s daughter all became ill.14 Subsequently, several
independent clusters of cases were noted in seven munici-
palities in Southern China. From November 10, 2002 until
February 9, 2003 there were 305 cases of SARS identified
in Guangdong Province. Many of the afflicted patients were
healthcare workers. The first identified spread of SARS to
Hong Kong occurred on February 21, 2003. This involved a
64-year-old physician from Zhongshan University in Guang-
dong Province who travelled to Hong Kong to attend a
wedding. Prior to his hospitalisation in Hong Kong he stayed
in the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong for 1 day. Subse-
quently, 10 secondary cases occurred in other hotel guestsTable 2 CDC preliminary case definition for SARS as of March
Suspect case
Respiratory illness of unknown aetiology with onset since Februa
 Documented temperature > 100.4 8F (38 8C)
 One or more symptoms of respiratory illness (e.g. cough, sho
of pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome)
 Close contacty within 10 days of onset of symptoms with a p
travel within 10 days of onset of symptoms to an area with d
* From: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Outbreak o
2003, 52:226–228.
y Defined as having cared for, having lived with, or having had di
person suspected of having SARS.and these infected and ill persons led directly to tertiary
cases in two Hong Kong hospitals and outbreaks in Singa-
pore, Toronto and Hanoi.15AETIOLOGY
Using classical virologic methods, the causative viral agent
of SARS was identified in three laboratories in mid March
2003.15–18 Viral particles were seen on electron micro-
scopic examination of swabs and sputum specimens from
SARS patients. The SARS virus grew in Vero cell and fetal
rhesus kidney cell tissue cultures. Cytopathic effect was
noted in the Vero cell cultures in 5 to 6 days and in the
fetal rhesus kidney cell cultures in 2 to 4 days.16,17 This virus,
which was a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV), was rapidly
identified using both conventional virologic methods and
cutting edge molecular biology. The genome was completely
and rapidly sequenced in several laboratories.4–8 This was a
significant accomplishment when one realises that corona-
viruses have the largest genomes (30 000 bases of positive-
strand RNA) found in any RNA virus. Sequence data allowed
the rapid development of highly specific diagnostic tests and
also helped in the epidemiologic study of the mini pandemic.
The genome sequence data from human isolates
assisted in the search for the origin of the disease when
similar viruses were isolated from Himalayan palm civets
and raccoon dogs in a live animal market in Shenzhen,19, 2003*.
ry 1, 2003 and the following criteria:
rtness of breath, difficulty breathing or radiographic findings
erson under investigation for or suspected of having SARS or
ocumented transmission of SARS as defined by the WHO.
f severe acute respiratory syndrome-Worldwide, 2003. MMWR
rect contact with respiratory secretions and/or body fluids of a
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Table 3 WHO SARS case definitions* (Revised 1 May, 2003).
Suspect case
1. A person presenting after 1 November 2002a with history of:
- high fever (>38 8C)
and
- cough or breathing difficulty
and one or more of the following exposures during the 10 days prior to onset of symptoms:
- close contactb with a person who is a suspect or probable case of SARS
- history of travel to an area with recent local transmission of SARS
- residing in an area with recent local transmission of SARS
2. A person with an unexplained acute respiratory illness resulting in death after 1 November, 2002,a but on whom no
autopsy has been performed and one or more of the following exposures during to 10 days prior to onset of symptoms:
- close contact,b with a person who is a suspect or probable case of SARS
- history of travel to an area with recent local transmission of SARS
- residing in an area with recent local transmission of SARS
Probable case
1. A suspect case with radiographic evidence of infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome (RDS)
on chest X-ray (CXR)
2. A suspect case of SARS that is positive for SARS coronavirus by one or more assays (See: Use of laboratory methods
for SARS diagnosis.)
3. A suspect case with autopsy findings consistent with the pathology of RDS without an identifiable cause
Exclusion criteria
A case should be excluded if an alternative diagnosis can fully explain their illness.
Reclassification of cases
As SARS is currently a diagnosis of exclusion, the status of a reported case may change over time. A patient should always
be managed as clinically appropriate, regardless of their case status
- A case initially classified as suspect or probable, for whom an alternative diagnosis can fully explain the illness, should be
discarded after carefully considering the possibility of co-infection
- A suspect case who, after investigation, fulfils the probable case definition should be reclassified as ‘probable’
- A suspect case with a normal CXR should be treated as deemed appropriate and monitored for 7 days. Those cases in
which recovery is inadequate should be re-evaluated by CXR
- Those suspect cases in whom recovery is adequate but whose illness cannot be fully explained by an alternative diagnosis
should remain as ‘suspect’
- A suspect case who dies, on whom no autopsy is conducted, should remain classified as ‘suspect’. However, if this case is
identified as being part of a chain transmission of SARS, the case should be reclassified as ‘probable’
- If an autopsy is conducted and no pathological evidence of RDS is found, the case should be ‘discarded’
a The surveillance period begins on 1 November 2002 to capture cases of atypical pneumonia in China now recognized as SARS.
International transmission of SARS was first reported in March 2003 for cases with onset in February 2003.
b Close contact: having cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with respiratory secretions or body fluids of a suspect or
probable case of SARS.
* From: the World Health Organization Case Definitions for Surveillance of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/casedefinition/en/.China.19 The viral genomes recovered in nasal swabs from
the palm civets were 99.8% homologous to the human
SARS-CoV isolates. Early in the epidemic Orf8 reading
frame sequences from human isolates were identical to




As noted above, SARS originated in Southern China in
November 2002. Presumably the first case or cases were
the result of transmission from palm civets to humans.Subsequently, human to human transmission occurred.
Apparently, human to human transmission did not occur
outside of China until February 21, 2003 when the adult
physician from Guangdong Province, whose illness com-
menced on February 15, stayed at the Metropole Hotel in
Hong Kong.15 The chronology of events related to the
Metropole Hotel is presented in Fig. 1. Case A (the primary
case) stayed on the ninth floor of the hotel on February 21,
2003 and was then admitted to hospital #2 the following
day and died on February 23, 2003. Secondary cases
related to Case A, in addition to cases B to K, were four
healthcare workers at hospital #2 and two of the patient’s
family members.
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on the ninth floor of the Metropole Hotel at the same time
as Case A. He travelled to Hanoi on February 23, 2003 and
he also became ill on that day. He was hospitalised on
February 26, 2003 at the Vietnam French Hospital in HanoiTable 4 Revised Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists
Clinical criteria
Early illness
 Presence of two or more of the following features: fever (mig
sore throat, or rhinorrhea
Mild-to-moderate respiratory illness
 Temperature of >100.4 8F (> 38 8C)* and
 One or more clinical findings of lower respiratory illness (e.g.
Severe respiratory illness
 Meets clinical criteria of mild-to-moderate respiratory illness a
 One or more of the following findings:
–— Radiographic evidence of pneumonia or
–— Acute respiratory distress syndrome or
–— Autopsy findings consistent with pneumonia or acute resp
Epidemiologic criteria
Possible exposure to SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
One or more of the following exposures in the 10 days before
 Travel to a foreign or domestic location with documented or
 Close contactb with a person with mild-to-moderate or sever
before onset of symptoms to a foreign or domestic location w
of SARS-CoVa
Likely exposure to SARS-CoV
One or more of the following exposures in the 10 days before
 Close contactb with a person with confirmed SARS-CoV dise
 Close contactb with a person with mild-to-moderate or sever
can be linked to a confirmed case of SARS-CoV disease in th
Laboratory criteria
Tests to detect SARS-CoV are being refined and their performa
diagnosis of SARS-CoV are changing. The following are gener
 Detection of serum antibody to SARS-CoV by a test validated
 Isolation in cell culture of SARS-CoV from a clinical specimen
 Detection of SARS-CoV RNA by a reverse transcription polym
subsequent confirmation in a reference laboratory (e.g. CDC)
Information about the current criteria for laboratory diagnosis of S
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/labdiagnosis.htm
Exclusion criteria
A case may be excluded as a SARS report under investigation (
case, if any of the following apply:
 An alternative diagnosis can explain the illness fullyd or
 Antibody to SARS-CoV is undetectable in a serum specimen
 The case was reported on the basis of contact with a person
disease; then the reported case is also excluded, provided oth
Case classification
SARS RUI
Reports in persons from areas where SARS is not known to be activ
 SARS RUI-1: cases compatible with SARS in groups likely to b
from a person without clear epidemiologic links to known cas
transmission of SARS-CoVand was placed on mechanical ventilation on March 2,
2003. On March 5, 2003 he was medically evacuated to
hospital #4 in Hong Kong and died there on March 12,
2003. In the Hanoi hospital, 37 healthcare workers became
secondary cases. A healthcare worker from Bangkok whosurveillance case definition for SARS, December 2003*.
ht be subjective), chills, rigors, myalgia, headache, diarrhea,
cough, shortness of breath or difficulty breathing)
nd
iratory distress syndrome without an identifiable cause
onset of symptoms:
suspected recent transmission of SARS-CoVa or
e respiratory illness and history of travel in the 10 days
ith documented or suspected recent transmission
onset of symptoms:
ase or
e respiratory illness for whom a chain of transmission
e 10 days before onset of symptoms
nce characteristics assessedc; therefore, criteria for laboratory
al criteria for laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV:
by CDC (e.g. enzyme immunoassay) or
or
erase chain reaction test validated by CDC and with
ARS-CoV is available at
SARS RUI), including as a CDC-defined probable SARS-CoV
obtained > 28 days after onset of illnesse or
who was subsequently excluded as a case of SARS-CoV
er epidemiologic or laboratory criteria are not present
e
e first affected by SARS-CoVf if SARS-CoV is introduced
es of SARS-CoV disease or places with known ongoing
266 J. D. CHERRY
Table 4 Continued
 SARS RUI-2: cases meeting the clinical criteria for mild-to-moderate illness and the epidemiologic criteria for possible
exposure (spring 2003 CDC definition for suspect casesg)
 SARS RUI-3: cases meeting the clinical criteria for severe illness and the epidemiologic criteria for possible exposure
(spring 2003 CDC definition for probable casesg)
 SARS RUI-4: cases meeting the clinical criteria for early or mild-to-moderate illness and the epidemiologic criteria for likely
exposure to SARS-CoV
SARS-CoV disease
 Probable case of SARS-CoV disease: meets the clinical criteria for severe respiratory illness and the epidemiologic
criteria for likely exposure to SARS-CoV
 Confirmedcaseof SARS-CoVdisease: clinically compatible illness (i.e. early,mild-to-moderate, or severe) that is laboratory confirmed
*From: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Revised U.S. Surveillance Case Definition for severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) and Update of SARS Cases – United States and Worldwide, December 2003. MMWR 2003, 52:1202–1206.
* A measured documented temperature of >100.4 8F (> 38 8C) is expected. However, clinical judgment may allow a small
proportion of patients without a documented fever to meet this criterion. Factors that might be considered include: patients’ self-report
of fever; use of antipyretics; presence of immunocompromising conditions or therapies; lack of access to healthcare; or inability to obtain
a measured temperature. Initial case classification based on reported information might change, and reclassification might be required.
a Types of locations specified will vary (e.g. country, airport, city, building, or floor of building). The last date a location may be a
criterion for exposure is 10 days (one incubation period) after removal of that location from CDC travel alert status. The patient’s
travel should have occurred on or before the last date the travel alert was in place. Transit through a foreign airport meets the
epidemiologic criteria for possible exposure in a location for which a CDC travel advisory is in effect. Information about CDC travel
alerts and advisories and assistance in determining appropriate dates are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/travel.htm.
b Close contact is defined as having cared for or lived with a person with SARS or having a high likelihood of direct contact with
respiratory secretions and/or body fluids of a person with SARS (during encounters with the patient or through contact with materials
contaminated by the patient) either during the period the person was clinically ill or within 10 days of resolution of symptoms.
Examples of close contact include kissing or embracing, sharing eating or drinking utensils, close (i.e. <3 feet) conversation, physical
examination, and any other direct physical contact between persons. Close contact does not include activities such as walking by a
person or sitting across a waiting room or office for a brief time.
c The identification of the aetiologic agent of SARS (i.e. SARS-CoV) led to the rapid development of enzyme immunoassays and
immunofluorescence assays for serologic diagnosis and reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction assays for detection of SARS-
CoV RNA in clinical samples. These assays can be very sensitive and specific for detecting antibody and RNA, respectively, in the later
stages of SARS-CoV disease. However, both are less sensitive for detecting infection early in illness. The majority of patients in the early
stages of SARS-CoV disease have a low titre of virus in respiratory and other secretions and require time to mount an antibody
response. SARS-CoV antibody tests might be positive as early as 8–10 days after onset of illness and often by 14 days after onset of
illness, but sometimes not until 28 days after onset of illness. Information about the current criteria for laboratory diagnosis of SARS-
CoV is available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/labdiagnosis.htm.
d Factors that may be considered in assigning alternate diagnoses include the strength of the epidemiologic exposure criteria for
SARS-CoV disease, the specificity of the alternate diagnostic test, and the compatibility of the clinical presentation and course of illness
with the alternative diagnosis.
e Current data indicate that > 95% of patients with SARS-CoV disease mount an antibody response to SARS-CoV. However,
health officials may choose not to exclude a case on the basis of lack of a serologic response if reasonable concern exists that an
antibody response could not be mounted.
f Consensus guidance is in development between CDC and CSTE on which groups are most likely to be affected first by SARS-CoV
if it re-emerges. SARS-CoV disease should be considered at a minimum in the differential diagnoses for persons requiring
hospitalisation for pneumonia confirmed radiographically or acute respiratory distress syndrome without identifiable aetiology
and who have one of the following risk factors in the 10 days before the onset of illness: (1) Travel to mainland China, Hong Kong, or
Taiwan, or close contact with an ill person with a history of recent travel to one of these areas, or; (2) Employment in an occupation
associated with a risk for SARS-CoV exposure (e.g. healthcare worker with direct patient contact or worker in a laboratory that
contains live SARS-CoV) or; (3) Part of a cluster of cases of atypical pneumonia without an alternative diagnosis. Guidelines for the
identification, evaluation, and management of these patients are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/absenceofsars.htm.
g During the 2003 SARS epidemic, CDC case definitions were the following: Suspect case; (1) Meets the clinical criteria for mild-to-
moderate respiratory illness and the epidemiologic criteria for possible exposure to SARS-CoV but does not meet any of the
laboratory criteria and exclusion criteria or; (2) Unexplained acute respiratory illness that results in death of a person on whom an
autopsy was not performed and that meets the epidemiologic criteria for possible exposure to SARS-CoV but does not meet any of
the laboratory criteria and exclusion criteria; Probable case; (3) Meets the clinical criteria for severe respiratory illness and the
epidemiologic criteria for possible exposure to SARS-CoV but does not meet any of the laboratory criteria and exclusion criteria.
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Figure 1 Chain of transmission among guests at Hotel M – Hong Kong, 2003. (From: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Update: Outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome – Worldwide, 2003. MMWR 2003; 52:241–248.).
Figure 2 Cumulative number of reported suspect or probable SARS cases and countries or administrative regions in the world from
March 17, 2003 to July 31, 2003. The number of countries decreased from 33 to 29 when cases in some countries were found not to be
SARS. Similarly the final count of cases also decreased with the elimination of cases which were later found not to be SARS. The March 17
and 24, 2003 dates include the initial 305 cases from Southern China which were not included in the WHO reports.
268 J. D. CHERRYwas investigating the outbreak in Hanoi became ill and
returned to Bangkok.
Patients C, D, and E were the primary cases in Singapore
and their illnesses led to 70 cases in Singapore and three
cases in Germany. Patients F and G were the initial cases in
Canada and Case F was subsequently linked to a cluster of
16 cases in Toronto. Patients H and J were linked to
outbreaks among healthcare workers in Hong Kong hos-
pitals #1 and #3. Patients I, L, and M were suspect cases in
the United States. Case K was a potential primary case in
Ireland.
On February 28, 3003 the Hanoi office of the World
Health Organization was contacted by officials at the
Vietnam French Hospital.20 They were concerned about
the unusual influenza-like illness that patient B had which
they suspected could have been due to an avian influenza
virus. Dr. Carlo Urbani from the WHO office answered the
call and rapidly determined that the illness which had
spread throughout the hospital was unusual. He carried
out an extensive on-site investigation and worked with the
hospital staff to set up quarantine procedures. His efforts
led to the containment of SARS in Hanoi. Unfortunately, he
became ill with SARS on March 11, 2003 and died in an
isolation room in a Bangkok hospital on March 29, 2003. He
did not live to see the worldwide successes of SARS control
which resulted to a great extent from his early detection of
SARS.
Following the recognition of SARS at the end of Feb-
ruary in Hanoi, Vietnam the World Health Organization
initiated the coordination of a global response. Beginning on
March 17, 2003 the WHO published electronically a daily
(exclusive of Sunday) summary of reported suspect and
probable SARS cases.2 This continued until July 11, 2003. A
final update of probable cases and the number of countries
was posted on April 30, 2004 for the period November 1,
2002 to July 31, 2003. A weekly summary of these data are
presented in Fig. 2. The initial report on March 17, 2003
noted 167 cases in 7 countries or special administrative
regions. Neither this report or the next Monday’s report
included China. (In Fig. 2 the initial 305 cases for Southern
China as well as the entire country have been included for
the March 17 and 24, 2003 time points.) This March 17th
report included 5 countries, with cases linked to Hong Kong
and the Metropole Hotel. It also includes two suspect or
probable cases in Switzerland. Over the next several days
the case counts in Switzerland varied between zero and
seven but a subsequent study indicated only one case with
no subsequent transmission.
By March 24, 2003 there were 761 cases in 15 countries
or special administrative regions. New countries at this time
were France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Taiwan, the United King-
dom and the United States. In France the total cases
reached seven, all of whom were imported with no local
transmission within the country. In Italy the total number of
cases reached four and all were imported. In Ireland there
was one accepted case and, as noted above, this case had alink to the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong. Throughout this
reporting period there was one case in Spain, four cases in
the United Kingdom and 27 cases in the United States, all
cases in these three countries were imported. In Taiwan
there were six cases noted on March 24, 2003 and there
had been evidence of local transmission. The first case in
Taiwan occurred on February 25 and the last probably case
occurred on June 15, 2003. A total of 697 cases were
reported in Taiwan at the peak of the epidemic but almost
half were later excluded. In Taiwan the total number of
imported cases was only 21 and the vast majority were the
result of local transmission.
An addition to the effected countries on March 31, 2003
was Romania. Initially three cases were noted but the final
count was one imported case with no further transmission.
New countries on April 7, 2003 were Australia, Brazil and
Malaysia. Of these countries Australia and Malaysia had six
and five imported cases respectively, and Brazil was later
removed from the list. New countries on April 14, 2003
included Indonesia, Kuwait, the Philippines, South Africa
and Sweden. Of these countries, local secondary transmis-
sion occurred only in the Philippines. Seven of the 14 cases
were importations. New countries as of April 21, 2003
were India, Japan and Mongolia. Of these countries, no
secondary transmission occurred in India, Japan was later
removed from the list and in Mongolia there were nine
cases with eight of these being importations.
As of May 12, 2003 new countries or administration
regions included Bulgaria, China, Macao SAR, Columbia,
Finland, Poland and the Republic of Korea. Of these
countries or regions only Macao SAR and the Republic
of Korea had accepted cases and in both regions the cases
were imported. In the June 2nd report one case in the
Russian Federation was noted but this was subsequently
removed from the data set.
Eighty-seven per cent of all probably SARS cases occurr-
ed in Hong Kong or China and information relating to these
cases in presented elsewhere in this symposium. Only five
other countries (Canada, Taiwan, Singapore, the United
States and Vietnam) had more than 20 probable cases. In
Canada there were 257 cases with the first case occurring
on February 23, 2003 and the last case on June 12, 2003.
The vast majority of cases in Canada (98%) were secondary
to five primary importations and 43% of the cases occurred
in healthcare workers. In Taiwan 6% of the cases were
importations and 20% occurred in healthcare workers. In
Singapore 3% of the cases were importations and 41% of
the locally acquired cases were in healthcare workers. In
Singapore the epidemic was controlled within 13 weeks of
the initial importation. All 27 probable cases in the United
States were importations. However, only eight of these
were laboratory confirmed. In Vietnam, 62 of the 63 cases
were the result of local transmission. The outbreak was con-
trolled within 7 weeks of the first and only imported case.
In summary, the SARS mini pandemic of 2002–2003
probably does not deserve to be called a pandemic.
CHRONOLOGY OF THE 2002–2003 SARS MINI PANDEMIC 269However, the death rate in adults was sobering. In reality,
significant epidemic disease occurred in only five countries
and the special administrative region of Hong Kong.
Nevertheless, SARS was an eye opener in regard to the
number of healthcare workers who became infected.
Hopefully the clinical lessons relating to isolation practices,
personnel protection and the effective use of quarantine
will be retained. Personally I will be less cavalier in my
approach to patients with fever and respiratory illness.REFERENCES
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